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Abstract 
Scientific knowledge and advances are a cornerstone of modern society. They improve our 
understanding of the world we live in and help us navigate global challenges including 
emerging infectious diseases, climate change and the biodiversity crisis. For any scientist, 
whether they work primarily in fundamental knowledge generation or in the applied 
sciences, it is important to understand how science fits into a decision-making framework. 
Decision science is a field that aims to pinpoint evidence-based management strategies. It 
provides a framework for scientists to directly impact decisions or to understand how their 
work will fit into a decision process. Decision science is more than undertaking targeted and 
relevant scientific research or providing tools to assist policy makers; it is an approach to 
problem formulation, bringing together mathematical modelling, stakeholder values and 
logistical constraints to support decision making. In this paper we describe decision science, 
its use in different contexts, and highlight current gaps in methodology and application. The 
COVID-19 pandemic has thrust mathematical models into the public spotlight, but it is one 
of innumerable examples in which modelling informs decision making. Other examples 
include models of storm systems (eg. cyclones, hurricanes) and climate change. Although 
the decision timescale in these examples differs enormously (from hours to decades), the 
underlying decision science approach is common across all problems. Bridging 
communication gaps between different groups is one of the greatest challenges for 
scientists. However, by better understanding and engaging with the decision-making 
processes, scientists will have greater impact and make stronger contributions to important 
societal problems.  
Scientific discoveries have fuelled enormous change in our society. Despite this, scientists 
are under increasing pressure to not only make discoveries and test hypotheses, but to 
engage with the public and contribute to solving real-world problems (Pham 2016). While 
improving dialogue between scientists and policy-makers is important (Cvitanovic et al. 
2015; Berger et al. 2019), achieving scientific impact requires more than effective 
communication. For any given scientific problem, scientists need to carefully consider the 
wider context in which decisions are made, including differing value judgements, and the 
feasibility and cost of various responses. The field of decision science explicitly aims to 
better forecast whether actions and policies will achieve decision-makers’ goals, with the 
ultimate aim to provide tailored, situation-specific, and relevant advice. While much 
scientific research is conducted without the express aim of informing policy, scientists who 
do want to directly influence decisions need to have a clear understanding of the utility of 
scientific outputs to stakeholders and the broader community. Even for those who do not 
aim to directly engage in that process, a sound understanding of it will help to communicate 
the diverse activities that constitute science. 
 
The key feature of decision science is that it identifies, first and foremost, a decision 
problem, which includes the context of an issue. This contrasts with the more typical focus 
in science on either a hypothesis or discovery. Importantly, the decision problem describes a 
situation where some action is required, and the overall aim is to choose actions to take, 
rather than to learn. Learning about the system itself, while perhaps even a necessary step 
along the way, is not prioritised for its own sake. The decision science approach – putting 
objectives and actions at the forefront – is common across all decision problems 
(Possingham et al. 2001), even though the process can look very problem-specific and the 
actual methods used for any particular decision analysis can vary widely. 
 
Decision science principles have been used widely in business (French et al. 2009), but have 
not yet been adopted broadly across the sciences. One area where decision science has 
been used widely is in spatial planning for conservation (Ball et al. 2009). Using decision 
science within the context of scientific research brings prediction and optimisation – deeply 
mathematical fields of science – to the fore (Guisan et al. 2013). But decision science is 
broader. Not only does it consider the specific decision problem and immediate 
stakeholders, but the broader social and governance implications (Figure 1). Accordingly, a 
decision science approach will naturally bring together a diverse multi-disciplinary team, 
including (at a minimum) domain experts (in, for example, the life or physical sciences), 
mathematical modellers and social scientists. 
 
In this paper we describe our vision for how decision science can make an impact 
throughout science and in the life sciences in particular. We begin with an overview of 
structured decision making (Gregory et al. 2012) – a cornerstone decision science 
methodology – before describing our extended vision of decision science. We expand on the 
utility of decision science, describing how decision science can improve the solving of 
diverse real-world problems, from pandemic management plans, to large scale 
environmental conservation. We finish by exploring the current frontiers of decision science 
and identifying critical gaps. 
 
Structured Decision Making  
Decision-makers are often tasked with making a meaningful contribution to solving complex 
problems. Structured decision making provides a framework for breaking down complex 
problems into manageable steps to harness the complexity. It is a participatory process that 
draws together objectives around an issue, determines potential actions and attempts to 
predict their outcomes, before finally determining a recommended pathway forward. In this 
section we give a brief overview of the methodology, but we encourage readers interested 
in using structured decision making to study more comprehensive analyses of the topic 
(Martin et al. 2009; Clemen & Reilly 2013). 
 
Identifying the fundamental objective(s) 
Objective-setting is an inclusive process whereby stakeholders identify the ideal end goal(s) 
they wish to achieve. Each specific aim should be narrowed to a set of measurable 
fundamental objectives. Importantly, the set of fundamental objectives can include multiple 
and even competing objectives.  
 
Determine potential actions 
Actions include any type of intervention that affects the system itself, such as policy changes 
or on-ground projects. ‘No action’ should always be an option we consider and doing 
nothing should be a conscious choice. The list of potential actions should be as diverse as 
possible, and not be constrained by a priori assumptions on pre-conceived views about 
feasibility and/or effectiveness.  
 
Predict the outcome of potential actions 
Once objectives are set, and potential actions have been identified, it is necessary to predict 
how well each action will help achieve the fundamental objective(s). This is often achieved 
through a mathematical modelling approach. Importantly, whatever approach is used to 
make predictions, we should quantify the uncertainty in those predictions (Milner-Gulland & 
Shea 2017). Scientists can make a critical contribution to this part of the structured decision 
making process. Scientists can provide fundamental scientific knowledge behind an 
uncertain process and develop models (mathematical or otherwise) to forecast the state of 
a system into the future in response to actions and under different scenarios.  
 
Determine a pathway forward 
Once the effect of implementing each action is quantified, the action, or set of actions that 
best meet the fundamental objective must be determined. In some situations, competing 
objectives may arise, where actions help achieve one objective at the expense of achieving 
another. In these contexts, additional processes such as multi-criteria decision analysis 
(Mendoza & Martins 2006)  and/or conflict resolution may be required (Biggs et al. 2017).  
 
Importantly, the selected actions should not be confused with the fundamental objective 
itself. In structured decision making, actions are never an objective that one aims to achieve 
from the start. However, once the best actions are identified, some refer to them as means 
objectives or intermediate objectives (Schwartz et al. 2018). But even if named as such, 
means objectives are but stepping stones towards achieving the fundamental objective. For 
example, if eliminating measles is the fundamental objective, vaccinating 95% of the 
population against measles may be a means objective. Where a means objective is mistaken 
for the fundamental objective, poor outcomes can be expected, driven first and foremost by 
the chance that the purpose of the action is lost, forgotten or ignored. This is like 
Goodhart’s law: “when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.” 
 
Decision Science as a pathway for impact 
Our vision of decision science for impact extends beyond structured decision making by 
embedding structured decision making within an overarching understanding of the social, 
political and organisational context in which decisions are made and implemented (Figure 
1). In particular, decision analyses often focus on understanding systems and identifying 
actions that meet fundamental system-level objectives, while keeping economic costs low. 
But there are many more factors that matter, including political and logistical constraints 
and social and ethical accountability.  
 
  
Figure 1: Decision science must be embedded within society’s overarching values and 
governance structures. There is a history of scientific outreach to help people and/or 
organisations make decisions. Embedding research within a broader discussion of 
stakeholders’ values is a core tenet of structured decision making, which provides a coherent 
way to progress contentious and difficult decisions. The final layer is governance in which the 
broader views of government bodies and the wider community are used to inform the 
scientific approach. This overall framework is what we define as decision science. Under this 
framework scientists formulate their questions in the most relevant way, with an 
understanding that their findings are but one part of the overall decision-making process. 
 
Understanding the overall context of decisions, and how scientific research fits into this 
puzzle, is important if scientists want their work to be used to inform decisions. The practice 
of integrating scientific knowledge, decision tools, stakeholder values and system 
governance in a single framework is what we define as decision science. As scientists 
interested in impact, we need to be aware of the broader context within which our work 
sits, even if we are not involved in all layers of that process. By understanding the decision 
science approach, we can make more timely and more effective contributions to evidence-
based decisions.  
 
An example of an environmental conservation approach that incorporates science, 
economics and decision analysis within broader value judgement and governance issues is 
the Project Prioritization Protocol, designed to help improve the New Zealand government’s 
spending on threatened species (Joseph et al. 2009). At its core, Project Prioritization 
Protocol is simply a calculation of cost-effectiveness, but its key advance was integrating 
logistical factors, including cost and probability of success, with judgements of species value 
in a decision-making framework that could be operationalised by government. The Project 
Prioritization Protocol approach has spread internationally, including to Australia (Brazill-
Boast et al. 2018) and the United States (Gerber 2016). The successful update of the method 
into government decision-making processes is due to a range of factors, including that it is: 
intuitive, collaborative, allows for value judgements, aligns with bureaucratic processes, and 
has a solid scientific and economic foundation. The protocol has not only increased 
efficiency, it has also increased investment (Brazill-Boast et al. 2018). 
 
Of course, not all initiatives go completely to plan. Box 1 explores two case studies where 
the findings of the underlying science have not been fully reflected in decision outcomes. 
The reasons are different in each of these case studies. In the first example, a failure to 
acknowledge the broader context in which the science fits led to a policy failure and 
reduced public trust in authorities’ ability to deal with environmental issues. In the second 
example, a failure to identify the true fundamental objective resulted in scientific advice 
being at odds with the policy decision. 
 
Box 1: Examples of science and decisions.  
The ‘Death-Row Dingoes’: feral goat control in Australia 
Ignoring societal values can turn scientifically sound actions into public policy failures. The 
case of the ‘death-row dingoes’ in Northern Queensland, Australia in 2016 (van Eeden et 
al. 2017) is a case in point. The Hinchinbrook Shire Council released two dingoes onto 
Pelorus Island in a bid to cost-effectively reduce the feral goat population. Due to 
concerns about their impacts on local bird populations, the dingoes were implanted with 
poison tablets that would activate within two years to ensure they would not become a 
long-term problem if they evaded capture. While some would argue this was a pragmatic 
and scientifically sound approach to reducing the threat, it caused national outrage and 
many questioned the ethics of the project (Yanco et al. 2019). In response, the 
Queensland Government ordered the Council to remove the dogs, and it reduced public 
trust in the authorities’ ability to deal with environmental issues (van Eeden et al. 2017).   
 
Risk management for bovine tuberculosis in the UK 
Public controversy can drown out a scientific solution. Bovine tuberculosis (TB) is a 
prominent issue in the UK, and some stakeholders advocate the widespread culling of 
badgers as a means to reduce transmission between herds. Bovine TB management is 
proving an expensive and contentious issue. The Guardian newspaper has dedicated a 
regular section to the issue, with over 200 articles since the year 2000 (e.g. Barkham 
2015; Doward 2018). Disease transmission models “predict that control of local badger 
populations and hence control of environmental transmission will have a relatively limited 
effect on all measures of bovine TB incidence” (Brooks-Pollock et al. 2014). Despite this 
evidence, badger culling still continues (Carrington 2019). This example provides a 
cautionary tale that even when sound science is conducted, it does not mean the public 
policy issue will be resolved. Navigating these situations involves stepping beyond 
scientific analysis and requires an understanding of how to create social change.  
 
 
The role of time scales in practical decision science 
 
Decision science provides a framework to make decisions across a variety of contexts. Even 
though the fundamental approach is the same, it is important to understand how contextual 
factors influence the implementation of decision science.  Some problems develop gradually 
over (e.g. climate change), while others are acute and elicit an immediate response (e.g. an 
Ebola outbreak or the COVID-19 pandemic). First consider climate change. While we 
continue to reduce our uncertainty about its future impact, intervention options and actions 
are already available, and, in principle, the world is both refining its understanding of the 
problem and implementing solutions (Wong-Parodi et al. 2016). In contrast, for pandemic 
events and natural disasters, such as earthquakes and tsunamis, the response relies on 
emerging knowledge gained during the event itself. While we can plan and deploy defence 
strategies beforehand and make systems more resilient, it is not until the event occurs that 
a disaster management plan can be enacted. 
 
So, how does decision science operate for problems with such contrasting time-scales? In 
situations which are unfolding slowly, scientific understanding accumulates slowly, and thus 
we have more time for participatory decision-making processes. On the other hand, in fast 
time-scale problems, such as emergency response, there is minimal, if any, time for 
participatory decision-making processes to be conducted. Structured decision making must 
happen beforehand, and its findings drawn upon as the response unfolds.  
 
Decision Science for Pandemic Preparedness  
Pandemics are rare, fast time-scale decision problems where stakeholders must be brought 
together to understand objectives and actions. Preparations must happen before the start 
of the event, in order to establish overarching principles, and ideally, to establish the trust 
and information-flow arrangements that underpin good decision making. Over the past 
decade, governments have been largely focused on preparing for an influenza pandemic , 
although plans for ‘Disease X’ had come to some prominence in recent years (Cousins 2018). 
As well documented elsewhere (Tabata et al. 2020), a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2 spread 
from Wuhan, China across the globe in early 2020. By late July, over 10 million infections, 
five hundred thousand deaths had been reported and reported case numbers were doubling 
every 40 days (Dong et al. 2020). The World Health Organization, The United States Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, and many national governments have highlighted the 
significant threats to society from emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases such as 
pandemic influenza, Ebola and SARS. As the COVID-19 pandemic has clearly demonstrated, 
an outbreak not only has the potential to result in many deaths, but also disrupt national 
and global economies. The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted virtually all international 
travel, disrupted global supply chains and strained medical supply logistics. Disease 
management approaches (many of which existed only in planning documents) have been 
put to the test. 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic is a global disaster, and countries have reacted quickly, many 
enforcing strict measures to limit disease spread. Compared to influenza, it presents 
challenges due to the lack of a pharmaceutical intervention, such as antiviral drugs or a 
vaccine. In their absence, policy makers have relied on non-pharmaceutical interventions, 
including border measures and community-wide physical distancing (Chu et al. 2020). The 
early experiences in China and Italy prompted many other countries to act quickly. Closing 
borders, banning large gatherings and even requiring residents to stay inside their houses 
for weeks at a time are extreme actions, commonplace and demonstrably effective (Tanne 
et al. 2020), despite not being considered in any pre-existing pandemic management plans 
that we could uncover.  
 
In this context, modelling to help inform decision-makers had to occur extremely quickly in 
the early stages of the pandemic (Shea et al. 2020). The number of publications that were 
released as technical reports or blog pages on institutional webpages and then as open 
access pre-prints has been enormous, surpassing any other topic in terms of rate of 
increase, and fortuitously, modelling of infectious diseases is a well-established field 
(Anderson & May 1979) and there has been a recent focus on incorporating models and 
decision analysis into pandemic planning (Alahmadi et al. 2020; Shearer et al. 2020). As both 
the decision-making process and the scientific knowledge of COVID-19 are moving quickly, 
scientists seeking to contribute to policy arguably need to already have trusted relationships 
with decision-makers in place to enable them to provide relevant scientific advice at the 
right time. Despite the short timeframes, the process of decision science and structured 
decision making remains the same. They key difference is that with less time, there are 
fewer opportunities to resolve uncertainty and make precise predictions. But this is a typical 
situation for an adaptive management cycle (Chadès et al. 2016), where decisions are made, 
data is collected, predictions are improved, and decisions are refined in a cycle. 
 
Decision making at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic focused on immediate health 
impacts of the virus and necessarily moved quickly, but as the pandemic progresses, the 
need to move from a fast decision problem, to a medium to long-term decision problem is 
becoming clear. While country lockdowns have been extremely successful in reducing 
transmission, they come with a raft of other costs, both economic, social and related to 
(non-COVID) health issues. Response options in this situation – faced the world over – 
constitute a challenging decision problem. It involves multiple competing objectives, 
occurring over multiple time-scales. These objectives will be valued differently by different 
people. And predictions of possible actions will all likely have large uncertainties due to the 
unprecedented nature of the event – both in terms of modelling the transmission of the 
virus, but also modelling the socio-economic outcomes of alternative responses given that 
the system under study has been impacted so strongly that many assumptions underlying 
socio-economic models may reasonably be challenged. On top of those complexities, how 
members of society respond to policies – when they have been subject to unprecedented 
and unexpected disruption and trauma, is both highly uncertain and likely highly 
heterogeneous. Decision science has approaches to address each of these challenges: when 
there are multiple objectives, multi-criteria decision analysis is useful (Marttunen et al. 
2017), when there is uncertainty, value of information theory can suggest the most useful 
data to collect (Canessa et al. 2015), and incentive theory and behavioural sciences can help 
predict people’s response to policy change (Laffont & Martimort 2009; Bavel et al. 2020). 
 
Beyond differing values around population health and the economy, there are also 
fundamental decisions to be made about whether elimination or suppression is the aim in 
responding to COVID-19 (although, a third strategy is to aim for herd immunity). While 
elimination within a region may allow resumption of many daily activities, it leaves the 
population susceptible and at high risk of future incursions. The other broad option is 
suppression, where measures would be kept in place for longer timeframes, with the goal of 
keeping prevalence stable and sufficiently low to ensure public health and clinical response 
remain effective. Suppression means that any outbreaks, or fluctuations in incidence, would 
be managed and die out, giving the population long-term protection, even if there are 
overseas introductions. Choosing between these options is not about value judgements. 
Rather it is about risk preference. The elimination option could have tremendous payoff, but 
comes at a higher risk of failure, and potentially delivers a ‘false sense of security’ to the 
population, itself a risk given the risk of failure. Robust decision making is the idea of 
choosing actions that minimise the probability of a bad outcome (Moore & Runge 2012). A 
risk-averse decision-maker would likely choose suppression (minimise probability of worst 
outcome), while another may maximise the chance of a good outcome (maximise the 
expected outcome).  
 
Decision science provides a way to explicitly frame scientific questions about COVID-19 
within the relevant community and government structures. Community consultation is 
required to properly understand the values of a population, and clear communication is 
important to ensure that everyone can understand the fundamentals of disease 
transmission and the potential outcomes of different management strategies. While these 
aspects bring together governance, community engagement and science, we must also 
include social and behavioural science, as it is critical to understand how policy influences 
community behaviours and therefore population transmission dynamics. Underlying all of 
these themes is trust, which must exist between scientists, governments and the general 
population. Losing public trust can undermine progress (“Building trust is essential to 
combat the Ebola outbreak” 2019; Bavel et al. 2020).  
 
 
Building relationships for effective decision science 
Decision science facilitates effective dialogue and relationships between scientists and 
decision-makers by providing a framework that requires scientists to elicit decision-maker 
opinions and values. Firstly, it demands that the scientists understand the decision context. 
A better understanding of decision-maker needs—type of inputs needed, the local context, 
the timing of decisions, stakeholder preferences and values, the degree of risk or 
uncertainty that is acceptable—can enable tailoring of scientific outputs for best application 
(Patt 2009; Marcot et al. 2012). Secondly, dialogue is also pivotal for fostering relationships, 
shared understanding, trust (from the decision-maker) in the scientific integrity of the 
process, and trust (from the scientist) that cautions and uncertainties in predictions will be 
considered appropriately (Patt 2009; Winterfeldt 2013; Doyle et al. 2014). Dialogue also 
allows scientists to gauge how their information is received, and provides them with the 
opportunity to clarify the scientific process, explain potential caveats or ways to apply 
findings across different contexts (Patt 2009).  
 
One of the specific challenges in decision science is how to communicate uncertainty in a 
way that supports decision making rather than inadvertently eliciting indecision or rejection 
of scientific information. Effective communication of uncertainty can build trust, and 
conversely, avoiding communication of uncertainty can undermine it (Patt 2009). 
Uncertainty can arise from a range of sources: incomplete knowledge of all parameters 
within a complex system, incomplete control of how a response will be implemented, and 
errors in measurement of estimates (Johnson et al. 2015).  The style of communication can 
also inadvertently contribute to uncertainty. For example, numerical likelihoods (e.g. ‘75% 
chance of occurring’) are perceived to be more certain than descriptive likelihoods (e.g. 
‘Likely to occur’) which are often misinterpreted (Doyle et al. 2014). In communicating 
uncertainty, scientists must reduce uncertainties to their ‘decision-relevant’ elements, 
describing the source of uncertainty, and incorporating uncertainty into estimates via use of 
credible intervals or ranges (Fischhoff & Davis 2014).  Ranges and credible intervals may 
incorporate a range of sources of uncertainty, including variability in estimates’ applicability 
to the decision context, and overall strength of the science (Fischhoff & Davis 2014).   
 
The Future of Decision Science 
 
So how, as scientists, can we reframe our practice to maximise our contribution to public 
policy? First and foremost, we must understand the context in which the technical work we 
perform might be used. Particularly for those who are impact-focused, technical work 
should be embedded within the decision science framework, acknowledging the societal 
values and political context in which decisions are made. If as a scientific community more 
of us can engage and work in this way, science will play a greater and more effective role in 
public policy. Secondly, all scientists must recognise that resolving uncertainty is not always 
necessary for decision making. Some unknowns are critical to resolve, while others are 
irrelevant for decisions (Li et al. 2017). Critical aspects of uncertainty in the context of 
decision making are the objectives and the list of possible actions; and changing the actions 
or objectives alters which system uncertainties are important.  
 
While the decision science toolkit is well-developed, there are still areas where our current 
approaches are incomplete, which include balancing complexity and interpretability of 
solutions, and where stakeholders have antithetical aims and values. Complex decision 
problems often demand complex science and modelling, but increasing complexity makes it 
hard to understand and interpret results (Ferrer-Mestres et al. 2020). While creating tools 
that stakeholders can interact with helps understanding and dialogue (Winterfeldt 2013), 
we should aim to develop simple tools to aid decision-makers, that still convey the 
complexity and subtlety of the situation. Decision scientists have developed methods to 
deal with multiple competing objectives (Mendoza & Martins 2006; Marttunen et al. 2017), 
but these methods are designed for situations where there are trade-offs (for example, 
between biodiversity and economic gain), and are not equipped for situations where 
stakeholders are unwilling to make any trade-offs. The illegal wildlife trade is a prime 
example where there are extreme differences in opinion (Biggs et al. 2017) and decision 
science does not have an effective way forward.  
 
Throughout this paper we have articulated how decision science fits within public policy 
formation and how scientists can better align their work to increase its influence. Many of 
the topics are complex and are research areas in their own right, and continued research 
will improve our ability to engage in complex decision problems. However, despite the 
broad utility of decision science, we consider the name to be a misnomer. It’s less of a 
science than a problem-solving approach, and there’s no single ‘recipe for success’. The 
point of decision science is to view scientific problems from a decision-making perspective, 
focusing on objectives and feasible actions to identify critical scientific questions that will 
inform decisions. As such, the more widely the tenets of decision science are understood, 
there can be better science-based decisions and more real-world scientific impact. 
 
 Acknowledgements 
We acknowledge funding from The ARC Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decisions, 
The NHMRC Centres of Research Excellence Policy Relevant Infectious Disease Simulation 
and Mathematical Modelling (PRISM2) and Supporting Participatory Evidence use for the 
Control of Transmissible diseases in our Region Using Modelling (SPECTRUM), The ARC 
Centre of Excellence for Biodiversity Risk Analysis and The ARC Centre of Excellence for 
Mathematical and Statistical Frontiers.   
  
References  
Alahmadi, A., Belet, S., Black, A., Cromer, D., Flegg, J.A., House, T., et al. (2020). Influencing 
public health policy with data-informed mathematical models of infectious diseases: 
Recent developments and new challenges. Epidemics, 32, 100393. 
Anderson, R.M. & May, R.M. (1979). Population biology of infectious diseases: Part I. 
Nature, 280, 361–367. 
Ball, I.R., Possingham, H.P. & Watts, M.E. (2009). Marxan and Relatives: Software for Spatial 
Conservation Prioritization. In: Spatial conservation prioritization: quantitative 
methods and computational tools. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 185–195. 
Barkham, P. (2015). There’s only one reason for this badger cull – votes | Patrick Barkham. 
The Guardian. 
Bavel, J.J.V., Baicker, K., Boggio, P.S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., et al. (2020). 
Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response. Nat. 
Hum. Behav., 4, 460–471. 
Berger, K.M., Wood, J.L.N., Jenkins, B., Olsen, J., Morse, S.S., Gresham, L., et al. (2019). 
Policy and Science for Global Health Security: Shaping the Course of International 
Health. Trop. Med. Infect. Dis., 4, 60. 
Biggs, D., Holden, M.H., Braczkowski, A., Cook, C.N., Milner-Gulland, E.J., Phelps, J., et al. 
(2017). Breaking the deadlock on ivory. Science, 358, 1378–1381. 
Brazill-Boast, J., Williams, M., Rickwood, B., Partridge, T., Bywater, G., Cumbo, B., et al. 
(2018). A large-scale application of project prioritization to threatened species 
investment by a government agency. PLOS ONE, 13, e0201413. 
Brooks-Pollock, E., Roberts, G.O. & Keeling, M.J. (2014). A dynamic model of bovine 
tuberculosis spread and control in Great Britain. Nature, 511, 228–231. 
Building trust is essential to combat the Ebola outbreak. (2019). Nature, 567, 433–433. 
Canessa, S., Guillera-Arroita, G., Lahoz-Monfort, J.J., Southwell, D.M., Armstrong, D.P., 
Chadès, I., et al. (2015). When do we need more data? A primer on calculating the 
value of information for applied ecologists. Methods Ecol. Evol., 6, 1219–1228. 
Carrington, D. (2019). Badger cull in England extended to ‘unimaginable scale.’ The 
Guardian. 
Chadès, I., Nicol, S., Rout, T.M., Péron, M., Dujardin, Y., Pichancourt, J.-B., et al. (2016). 
Optimization methods to solve adaptive management problems. Theor. Ecol., 1–20. 
Chu, D.K., Akl, E.A., Duda, S., Solo, K., Yaacoub, S., Schünemann, H.J., et al. (2020). Physical 
distancing, face masks, and eye protection to prevent person-to-person transmission 
of SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19: a systematic review and meta-analysis. The Lancet, 
395, 1973–1987. 
Clemen, R.T. & Reilly, T. (2013). Making Hard Decisions with DecisionTools. Cengage 
Learning. 
Cousins, S. (2018). WHO hedges its bets: the next global pandemic could be disease X. BMJ, 
361. 
Cvitanovic, C., Hobday, A.J., van Kerkhoff, L., Wilson, S.K., Dobbs, K. & Marshall, N.A. (2015). 
Improving knowledge exchange among scientists and decision-makers to facilitate 
the adaptive governance of marine resources: A review of knowledge and research 
needs. Ocean Coast. Manag., 112, 25–35. 
Dong, E., Du, H. & Gardner, L. (2020). An interactive web-based dashboard to track COVID-
19 in real time. Lancet Infect. Dis., 20, 533–534. 
Doward, J. (2018). Minister’s claim that badger cull cuts cattle TB is attacked by experts. The 
Observer. 
Doyle, E.E.H., McClure, J., Paton, D. & Johnston, D.M. (2014). Uncertainty and decision 
making: Volcanic crisis scenarios. Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct., 10, 75–101. 
van Eeden, L.M., Dickman, C.R., Ritchie, E.G. & Newsome, T.M. (2017). Shifting public values 
and what they mean for increasing democracy in wildlife management decisions. 
Biodivers. Conserv., 26, 2759–2763. 
Ferrer-Mestres, J., Dietterich, T.G., Buffet, O. & Chadès, I. (2020). Solving K-MDPs. Proc. Int. 
Conf. Autom. Plan. Sched., 30, 110–118. 
Fischhoff, B. & Davis, A.L. (2014). Communicating scientific uncertainty. Proc. Natl. Acad. 
Sci., 111, 13664–13671. 
French, S., Maule, J. & Papamichail, N. (2009). Decision Behaviour, Analysis and Support. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gerber, L.R. (2016). Conservation triage or injurious neglect in endangered species recovery. 
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 113, 3563–3566. 
Gregory, R., Failing, L., Harstone, M., Long, G., McDaniels, T. & Ohlson, D. (2012). Structured 
Decision Making: A Practical Guide to Environmental Management Choices. John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Guisan, A., Tingley, R., Baumgartner, J.B., Naujokaitis‐Lewis, I., Sutcliffe, P.R., Tulloch, A.I.T., 
et al. (2013). Predicting species distributions for conservation decisions. Ecol. Lett., 
16, 1424–1435. 
Johnson, F.A., Eaton, M.J., Williams, J.H., Jensen, G.H. & Madsen, J. (2015). Training 
Conservation Practitioners to be Better Decision Makers. Sustainability, 7, 8354–
8373. 
Joseph, L.N., Maloney, R.F. & Possingham, H.P. (2009). Optimal Allocation of Resources 
among Threatened Species: a Project Prioritization Protocol. Conserv. Biol., 23, 328–
338. 
Laffont, J.-J. & Martimort, D. (2009). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. 
Princeton University Press. 
Li, S.-L., Bjørnstad, O.N., Ferrari, M.J., Mummah, R., Runge, M.C., Fonnesbeck, C.J., et al. 
(2017). Essential information: Uncertainty and optimal control of Ebola outbreaks. 
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 114, 5659–5664. 
Marcot, B.G., Thompson, M.P., Runge, M.C., Thompson, F.R., McNulty, S., Cleaves, D., et al. 
(2012). Recent advances in applying decision science to managing national forests. 
For. Ecol. Manag., 285, 123–132. 
Martin, J., Runge, M.C., Nichols, J.D., Lubow, B.C. & Kendall, W.L. (2009). Structured decision 
making as a conceptual framework to identify thresholds for conservation and 
management. Ecol. Appl., 19, 1079–1090. 
Marttunen, M., Lienert, J. & Belton, V. (2017). Structuring problems for Multi-Criteria 
Decision Analysis in practice: A literature review of method combinations. Eur. J. 
Oper. Res., 263, 1–17. 
Mendoza, G.A. & Martins, H. (2006). Multi-criteria decision analysis in natural resource 
management: A critical review of methods and new modelling paradigms. For. Ecol. 
Manag., 230, 1–22. 
Milner-Gulland, E. j. & Shea, K. (2017). Embracing uncertainty in applied ecology. J. Appl. 
Ecol., 54, 2063. 
Moore, J.L. & Runge, M.C. (2012). Combining Structured Decision Making and Value-of-
Information Analyses to Identify Robust Management Strategies. Conserv. Biol., 26, 
810–820. 
Patt, A. (2009). Communicating uncertainty to policy makers. In: Uncertainties in 
Environmental Modelling and Consequences for Policy Making, NATO Science for 
Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security (eds. Baveye, P.C., Laba, M. & 
Mysiak, J.). Springer Netherlands, pp. 231–251. 
Pham, D. (2016). Public engagement is key for the future of science research. NPJ Sci. Learn., 
1, 1–2. 
Possingham, H.P., Andelman, S.J., Noon, B.R., Trombulak, S. & Pulliam, H.R. (2001). Making 
smart conservation decisions. In: Conservation Biology: Research Priorities For The 
Next Decade. Island Press. 
Schwartz, M.W., Cook, C.N., Pressey, R.L., Pullin, A.S., Runge, M.C., Salafsky, N., et al. (2018). 
Decision Support Frameworks and Tools for Conservation. Conserv. Lett., 11, e12385. 
Shea, K., Runge, M.C., Pannell, D., Probert, W.J.M., Li, S.-L., Tildesley, M., et al. (2020). 
Harnessing multiple models for outbreak management. Science, 368, 577–579. 
Shearer, F.M., Moss, R., McVernon, J., Ross, J.V. & McCaw, J.M. (2020). Infectious disease 
pandemic planning and response: Incorporating decision analysis. PLOS Med., 17, 
e1003018. 
Tabata, S., Imai, K., Kawano, S., Ikeda, M., Kodama, T., Miyoshi, K., et al. (2020). Clinical 
characteristics of COVID-19 in 104 people with SARS-CoV-2 infection on the Diamond 
Princess cruise ship: a retrospective analysis. Lancet Infect. Dis. 
Tanne, J.H., Hayasaki, E., Zastrow, M., Pulla, P., Smith, P. & Rada, A.G. (2020). Covid-19: how 
doctors and healthcare systems are tackling coronavirus worldwide. BMJ, 368. 
Winterfeldt, D. von. (2013). Bridging the gap between science and decision making. Proc. 
Natl. Acad. Sci., 110, 14055–14061. 
Wong-Parodi, G., Krishnamurti, T., Davis, A., Schwartz, D. & Fischhoff, B. (2016). A decision 
science approach for integrating social science in climate and energy solutions. Nat. 
Clim. Change, 6, 563–569. 
Yanco, E., Nelson, M.P. & Ramp, D. (2019). Cautioning against overemphasis of normative 
constructs in conservation decision making. Conserv. Biol., 33, 1002–1013. 
 
 
 
 
 
